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Abstract: A great achievement makes one’s life go better independently of its re-
sults, but what makes an achievement great? A simple answer is—its difficulty. I
defend this view against recent, pressing objections by interpreting difficulty in
terms of competitiveness. Difficulty is determined not by how hard the agent
worked for the end but by how hard others would need to do in order to compete.
Successfully reaching a goal is a valuable achievement because it is difficult, and it
is difficult because it is competitive. Hence, both virtuosic performances and
lucky successes can be valuable achievements.
Though men pride themselves on their great deeds, these are not often the result of great plans,
but rather the result of chance. (La Rochefoucauld 2007[1678]: §57)
1. Introduction1
Many value theorists agree that great achievements make your life go bet-
ter2; to attain some properly significant goal through intentional, goal-di-
rected activity promotes your welfare.3 Such achievement-value is
independent of that borne by the fruit of your achievement. For example,
creating a beautiful and original artwork makes your life go better even if
you immediately lose the work to a studio-fire.
Not all successful goal-directed activities are valuable achievements of
course. In my case, at least, when I set out to get the mail, and then do so,
my performance does not amount to a valuable achievement. In order to iso-
late valuable achievements, most philosophical accounts begin with a ver-
sion of the following:
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Difficulty View (DV): Achieving a goal is valuable for the agent if doing so involves difficulty,
and it is more valuable the more difficulty it involves.
Several counterintuitive implications of DV lead most philosophers, how-
ever, to propose alternative conditions instead of or in addition to difficulty.4
Consider these three worrisome implications:
Needless difficulty: According to DV, injecting capsaicin under one’s skin before writing an ac-
ademic essay will increase the value the achievement of writing that essay bears for the writer
ceteris paribus.5
Misguided but lucky effort: According to DV, stumbling upon a buried treasure by pure luck af-
ter following a dowsing rod through a desert counts as a highly valuable achievement for the
treasure-hunter because of the effort spent with the dowsing rod.
Effortless virtuosity: According to DV, a highly skilled and practiced performer of a technical
composition on the violin does not attain an achievement of any significant value for herself
in performing the piece insofar as doing so is relatively easy for her to do.6
DV is indeed implausible if it entails that confronting such needless or
misguided but lucky difficulties contributes greatly to one’s welfare while
virtuosic performance does not. This paper considers whether these are
faults with DV itself or only the interpretation to which it is subjected.
I propose a new, unified interpretation of difficulty that avoids these
implications. On my view, achievement-value is solely determined by the
difficulty of the task, but the difficulty of the task is determined by how
much effort competitors would exhibit in a comparable task rather than
by how much effort the agent herself exhibits in the completion of the task.
My argument for this competitive interpretation of DV involves showing
how it handles versions of the three objections just enumerated better than
the most developed analysis of achievement-value currently on offer: what
I call the effortful interpretation (Bradford 2015).7 In Section 2, I argue that
DV is worth taking seriously, that difficulty is not bad for us the way it might
seem at first. In Section 3, I lay out the competitive and effortful interpreta-
tions side by side. In Section 4, I introduce an important qualification on
Bradford’s acceptance of DV: She argues that difficulty is required for and
that it contributes to, achievement-value but that there is another necessary
and contributory condition, competence. I show that DV, on my interpreta-
tion, better handles cases of needless difficulty (Section 5), lucky achieve-
ments (Section 6), and effortless artistic creations (Section 7) than does
Bradford’s analysis of achievement-value. In Section 8, I consider an objec-
tion to the competitive interpretation of DV based on the role personal
struggles play in our intuitions about achievement-value. I conclude that
the competitive interpretation provides an adequate analysis of achieve-
ment-value, allowing us to reach a reflective equilibrium with respect to
© 2019 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2019 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
THE COMPETITION ACCOUNT OF ACHIEVEMENT-VALUE 1019
our various intuitions and considered judgments regarding achievement and
welfare.
2. Isn’t difficulty bad for us?
Achievements contribute welfare value to the achiever independently of the
value of the product of the achievement. The magnitude of the value of the
achievement seems to track the difficulty of its accomplishment. This sug-
gests that difficulty itself contributes to, or even constitutes, the value of
the achievement. Hence, DV.
There is a common assumption that runs directly against DV. If true, tak-
ing DV as a starting point for an analysis of achievement-value would be
foolhardy. I think it’s false, unsurprisingly.
The assumption is that confronting difficulty in the pursuit of a goal is
prima facie bad for us.8 Perhaps no philosopher has articulated this assump-
tion withmore clarity and vigor than Schopenhauer. He argues that humans
are wired such that every impediment toward the immediate realization of
the ends we pursue constitutes a painful state of want or striving and that
all other aspects of our pursuits recede into the background against this pain-
ful striving:
Just as the brook makes no eddy as long as it encounters no obstacles, so too human as well as
animal nature entail that we do not properly notice and realize everything that goes in accor-
dance with ourwill. If wewere to notice it, then it must not have immediately gone in accordance
with our will, but must have met with some obstacle.—On the other hand, we sense directly, im-
mediately, and very clearly everything that opposes, crosses and resists our will, therefore all that
is unpleasant and painful. […] On this rests the negativity of well-being and happiness, frequently
emphasized by me, as opposed to the positivity of pain. (Schopenhauer 2015[1851]: 262)
Happiness and well-being have a negative character, for Schopenhauer, be-
cause what’s good in life (including great achievements) withdraws from our
attention in light of the constant struggle our activities require of us. Hence,
life, for Schopenhauer, is constant suffering.
Nietzsche, too, plays on the intuitiveness of this assumption while articu-
lating a directly opposed view, a view that agrees with DV:
Whether hedonism, [Schopenhauerian] pessimism, Utilitarianism, or eudaimonsim: all these
ways of thinking that measure the value of things according to pleasure and pain, that is accord-
ing to concomitants and incidentals, are foreground-ways-of-thinking and naiveties, uponwhich
anyone who appreciates the formative powers and an artist’s conscience will look not without
ridicule[…]. Youwant where possible—and there is no crazier ‘where possible’—to eliminate suf-
fering; and we?—it seems precisely that we would rather have it still higher and worse than it has
been! Well-being as you understand it—this is really no aim [Ziel], this appears to us as an end
[Ende]! ([1886] Beyond Good and Evil §225)9
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Nietzsche praises the value of suffering. The suffering or striving character-
istic of a difficult achievement is, he argues, itself valuable. Reflection on
Nietzsche’s example of artistic creation helps us see that things aren’t as sim-
ple as Schopenhauer would have us think.
Oftentimes artistic creation does indeed feel hard; there is a first-per-
sonal strain associated in general with exerting ourselves in performing
a difficult task. Call this phenomenal effort. Notice two things about phe-
nomenal effort: First, it’s not the same as other painful experiences; the
feeling of effort or strain in writing is very unlike a headache. Accord-
ingly, an artist might agree that the creation of an elaborate work of
art was difficult, even phenomenally effortful, and yet balk at
Schopenhauer’s suggestion that it was a pain. So, if difficulty is presumed
to be bad for us because it is presumed to entail a kind of pain, the bad-
ness of difficulty rests on a misunderstanding.
Second, whatever value we place on the phenomenal character of difficult
tasks, there are other reasons to affirm the positive value of difficulty. This
paper raises several. That there are such reasons is suggested already by
the attitudes we take toward difficult, past accomplishments. For instance,
we would not expect an artist to look back on an ambitious and successful
project with regret simply because it was so difficult. Imagine we could pres-
ent her with a choice between engaging another highly difficult project or
taking up amuch easier one which, we promise, will bear all the same instru-
mental value (in terms of aesthetic value, pay, accolades, etc.). Is it at all
clear that she would choose the easier project? Is it clear that the easier would
be the prudentially better choice? Even if it is desirable to avoid phenomenal
effort when all else is equal, it simply does not follow that difficult tasks are
less desirable for their difficulty.
I begin this paper by taking sides with Nietzsche, and against Schopen-
hauer, on this issue. I take it that confronting difficulty in the course of
an accomplishment enhances eo ipso one’s welfare. In my final view, it is
not phenomenal effort that contributes value but other features of diffi-
culty. For now, however, consider a thought experiment supporting
Nietzsche’s view against Schopenhauer’s. Bradford (2015, pp. 94–96) asks
us to imagine ‘a Utopia, where everything we could possibly need is at
arms’ reach, or at the touch of a button’—or, she adds when considering
the gray skies of boredom,10 with the pop of a pill. In such a place where
no exertion is necessary, would we not find ways to introduce challenges
into our easy lives? Since, by stipulation, such difficulties aren’t necessary
in order to obtain any valuable object or even to avoid boredom, ‘there
must be something about the [difficult] processes themselves that is
choiceworthy for its own sake’ (p. 96).
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If we are gripped by the prima facie plausibility that difficulty constitutes
achievement-value—that DV or something like it is true—the next question
is how to interpret DV.
3. What does it mean for a task to be difficult?
When is a task difficult and so (per DV) its completion a valuable achieve-
ment? If (again perDV) greater difficulty contributes greater value, then pre-
cisely how do we measure difficulty? The final aim of this paper is to defend
a new interpretation of the measure of difficulty that resolves the apparent
objections to DV from above. Here, I juxtapose this interpretation to
Bradford’s recent analysis of difficulty which is both probing and intuitive
though, I argue, ultimately mistaken. At stake in the debate between her
view and mine is whether difficulty requires that the agent find her perfor-
mance effortful.
3.1. BRADFORD’S EFFORTFUL INTERPRETATION OF DIFFICULTY
Bradford’s (2015, Ch. 2) interpretation seizes on the intuitive idea that a task
is difficult in virtue of the phenomenal effort one exerts in carrying it out.11
Accordingly, I call it the effortful interpretation. It has four principal
components.
Here are the first three:
E1. Difficulty consists in a degree of effort.
E2. Effort is a primitive (but quantifiable) feature of first-personal
experience.
E3. An activity is difficult for an agent in virtue of the effort the agent ex-
erts in carrying it out.
E1 and E3 are fairly self-explanatory. E2 is drawn from the notion of phe-
nomenal effort introduced above.12 I do not object to E2 in this paper; my
objection focuses on E3 and E4 (below).
Since all activities require some degree of effort on the agent’s part,
difficulty proper involves effort above a double-threshold on the effortful
interpretation. The first threshold marks off what Bradford (2015, pp.
50–51) calls ‘intense effort’ as opposed to a mere or background effort.
What matters for measuring the difficulty of a task, she argues, is not
the total phenomenal effort exerted by the agent in the performance of
the task. If that were so, then the first-personally easiest task imaginable
(watching mindless TV) could be more difficult than an incredibly effort-
ful task simply through being extended over a long enough period of
time (pp. 47–49). Instead, she counts only the effort above a threshold
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of intensity such that exhibiting this intense effort constitutes what we or-
dinarily call an effortful rather than effortless endeavor. Bradford does
not state how this intensity threshold is to be determined precisely. Per-
haps she thinks of it as primitive, like the notion of effort itself. Or per-
haps it is relative to the task, like the second threshold. My objection
below focuses on Bradford’s second threshold, and my alternative inter-
pretation does without an intensity threshold altogether.
Bradford argues that the second threshold should be determined abso-
lutely rather than agent-relatively. Specifically, she offers the following:
E4. ‘Difficult things require some sufficient degree of intense effort
greater than the average intense effort’ for the particular class of ac-
tivity (2015, p. 55).
These four analysans of difficulty serve as the effortful interpretation ofDV’s
claim that difficulty is required for and contributes to the value of an
achievement.
Consider the achievement of composing a short story. On the effortful in-
terpretation, the composition of a short story is difficult, and so a valuable
achievement, to the extent that the writing process involves sufficiently more
intense effort for the writer than the average composition involves for the av-
erage writer. Determining the precise threshold of E4 will require careful
consideration of the relevant class of activity, but the basic picture is clear
enough: The more effortful the task feels to the writer, the more difficult
and so valuable it is qua achievement.
I now compare the effortful interpretation to my preferred alternative.
3.2. INTERPRETING DIFFICULTY AS COMPETITIVE PERFORMANCE
I propose an interpretation of difficulty that departs from Bradford’s in a
couple key respects. In particular, instead of focusing on how effortful a task
feels to an agent, my interpretation focuses on whether the agent’s perfor-
mance of the task is competitive, in the sense of being an effortful task for
competitors to accomplish. On my interpretation, an activity is a valuable
achievement for the agent insofar as it outdoes others, and it is a greater
achievement the more it outdoes others.
This account is inspired by the thought that competition provides a special
(perhaps unique) means for determining the magnitude and value of human
endeavors by comparison. Nietzsche, again, gives voice to this thought when
he writes that a person’s strength
has a kind ofmeasure in the opposition for which he has need; every growth gives itself away by
seeking after amightier opponent—or problem: because a philosopher who is warlike challenges
even problems to duel. ([1888] Ecce Homo, ‘Why I am So Wise’ §7)
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A person’s strength is that feature explaining her capacity to achieve.13
Nietzsche’s point is that without a literal or implicit competitor, one has no
way to quantify one’s own strength or the degree of difficulty one faces in
striving after an achievement.My interpretation ofDV runswith this insight.
The competitive interpretation of difficulty is a formal interpretation
made up of these four components:
C1. Difficulty consists in a degree of effort.
C2. An activity is difficult for an agent in virtue of the effort an average
member of the activity’s reference class would exert in carrying out
the activity.
C3. The reference class of the activity the agent carries out consists in
those agents who are or have been engaged in like activities regarded
at the time of engaging in the activities.
C4. Difficult activities require some sufficient degree of effort by the ref-
erence class greater than the average degree of effort of the reference
class for an average like activity.
The competitive interpretation of difficulty is similar to the effortful inter-
pretation in that both treat the sort of difficulty conditioning valuable
achievement in terms of effort exerted above a determinate threshold
(C1 = E1; cf. C4 to E4). Both interpretations, moreover, treat that threshold
as relative to the class of activity to which the agent’s achievement is being
compared. In my case, the reference class is relative to the activity in the
same way (C3). While I cannot consider here how best to specify such activ-
ity classes, I point the reader to Bradford’s helpful discussion as a starting
point (2015, pp. 55–62). My focus in this paper is on the relative merits of
the effortful and competitive interpretations.
Where the competitive interpretation differs most from the effortful inter-
pretation is in rejecting the agent-relativity of the difficulty of an achieve-
ment (contrast C2 to E3). On the competitive interpretation, the agent
herself need not actually exert effort of the degree required by the threshold
described in C4 in order to count as having done something difficult and so
as having attained a valuable achievement. A task is difficult if the average
competitors’ completion of that task would involve more effort on their part
than the average comparable activity.
This rejection of agent-relativity in favor of interpersonal comparison is
the most distinctive feature of my competitive interpretation of difficulty.
VonKriegstein (2019), for instance, also criticizes the effortful interpretation
for being too agent-relative, but his proposed alternative is a dualistic inter-
pretation of difficulty. On the one hand, he embraces ‘something like’ the ef-
fortful interpretation as an interpretation of ‘agent-relative’ difficulty. And,
on the other hand, he supplements it with an ‘agent-neutral’ account of diffi-
culty measured not in terms of effort at all but in terms of probability of
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success. Valuable achievements, then, are those that are difficult in one or
both senses. I agree (partly for reasons discussed below) that neither the
agent-relative effortful interpretation nor the agent-neutral probabilistic in-
terpretation suffices on its own as an account of DV. But I worry about,
among other things, how precisely these discrete axes of difficulty are sup-
posed to interact in comparisons of achievement-value on such a dualistic
model.14 My approach here is different. When it comes to interpreting DV,
rather than conceiving of difficulty as an agent-relative notion (where the fact
of an endeavor’s difficulty varies based on who performs it) or an agent-neu-
tral notion (where there is a constant, objective fact of its difficulty)—and
rather than proposing to combine the two in some way—I conceive of diffi-
culty in terms of comparisons of actual persons (living or historical). In other
words, difficulty, onmyview, is an interpersonalmatter (i.e. relative to an im-
plicit sphere of competition) rather than a wholly subjective (i.e. relative to
the agent) or wholly objective one (i.e. relative at most to all agents or
humans as such). I argue that this competitive interpretation of DV provides
an adequate account of achievement-value all on its own.
Returning to the comparison to the effortful interpretation, a few more
points of clarification are in order. The competitive, unlike the effortful in-
terpretation, does not invoke an intensity threshold of effort. The competi-
tive interpretation of DV yields fairly consistent results regardless of how
finely we measure effort. This is because what matters on this interpretation
is only how much effort the average competitor would exert in the perfor-
mance in question as compared to the average performance of a like activity.
Atypical differences across agents in total effort exhibited in the perfor-
mance of a like activity will average out.
The competitive interpretation is formal because, in addition to a notion of
activity class, it requires a measure of effort in order to yield determinate re-
sults. In this paper, I take upBradford’s phenomenal conceptionof effort (E2)
for convenience.15 However, the competitive interpretation is more adapt-
able than the effortful interpretation to alternative measures of effort.16
On the competitive interpretation, the difficulty of an achievement is a
function of how effortful the task would be for the average comparable com-
petitor. This should not, however, be taken to imply that achievements are
only possible in the context of actual interpersonal competition.17
A philosopher who writes a groundbreaking book on a new area of in-
quiry is likely to count, on the competitive interpretation, as having done
something difficult (and so achievement-valuable) despite the fact that she
was not literally competing with anyone else in writing the book. The sense
of competitiveness relevant to assessing the difficulty of her performance
concerns simply whether this book would have been difficult for the average
philosopher to complete. We can approximate this counterfactual state of
affairs by identifying comparable philosophical works and assessing the av-
erage effort they required of their authors.18
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Beyond implicit competitions, like that between one philosopher and an-
other, we can also construe cases of self-competition as valuable achieve-
ments on my interpretation of DV. Consider Usain Bolt, the world-record
holder for the 100-m dash. He first set the record in the 2008 Summer Olym-
pics in Beijing. Since then, he has broken his own world-record twice. Imag-
ine an (admittedly preposterous) world where Bolt went on to break his own
world-record so many times that all other athletes abandoned the 100-m
race. As he continues setting new records, it would become increasingly irrel-
evant to compare Bolt’s latest performance to those of other runners.
Whether Bolt’s performance is properly difficult and so a valuable achieve-
ment would eventually be determined solely by comparing how much effort
it would have taken his prior self to match his latest performance.19
Interpreting DV competitively does not, in short, require there to be other
human beings who are or have engaged in the same activity in order for there
to be a fact of the matter regarding a performance’s difficulty and achieve-
ment-value. Nietzsche seems to have something like this in mind when de-
scribing philosophers as ‘challenging even problems to duel’; even a
solitary task can be competitive.
Below I compare the merits of the effortful and competitive interpreta-
tions of difficulty, arguing that the latter is superior. Unfortunately, we can-
not simply compare these two interpretations of difficulty by applying
problem cases directly to them because the full force of Bradford’s effortful
analysis of achievement-value requires a further move, one that is not neces-
sary for my competitive interpretation.20 While this move ultimately opens
her up to further objections, it is crucial for her response to the objections al-
ready raised above.
4. Is difficulty enough for achievement?
Bradford supplements difficulty with a further necessary and contributory
condition on achievement-value, competence. Specifically, she argues for
the following alternative to DV:
Difficulty-Competence View (DCV): Achieving a goal is valuable for the agent if the following
two necessary conditions aremet and to the extent that the two contributory conditions are met.
Difficulty: Achieving a goal is valuable for the agent only if doing so involves difficulty, and the
more difficulty involved in achieving the goal, the more valuable it is for the agent.
Competence: Achieving a goal is valuable for the agent only if the process of reaching it is carried
out with at least a minimum of competence, and the greater the competence with which the
achievement is carried out, the more valuable it is for the agent.
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DV and DCV both claim that difficulty is a necessary and contributory condition on achieve-
ment-value. But DCV does not take difficulty to be sufficient for achievement-value the way
DV does; DCV also takes competence to be a necessary and a contributory condition.
Bradford argues that competence is necessary for, and contributes to,
achievement-value on the basis of one of the objections to DV from above:
Misguided but lucky effort: According to DV, stumbling upon a buried treasure by pure luck af-
ter following a dowsing rod through a desert counts as a highly valuable achievement for the
treasure-hunter because of the effort spent with the dowsing rod.
She argues that luckily discovering treasure through arduous but misguided
means is not valuable in the way that diligently searching through records,
excavations, etc. is. Furthermore, she argues, ‘If difficulty were the only
source of value in achievements, then [the two] discoveries would have the
same [achievement-]value’ (Bradford 2015, p. 100). One easily sees how
the competence condition rules out misguided but lucky effort from being
a valuable achievement, even without spelling out a theory of competence.21
I raise concerns for the competence requirement below.22 But in order to
consider the full force of the effortful interpretation, and so present my argu-
ment against it in the most charitable light, we should bear in mind that
Bradford offers it as an interpretation of DCV rather than of DV.
5. The competitive interpretation better handles needless
difficulties
Regardless of whether we adopt DV orDCV, the competitive interpretation
yields a better response than the effortful interpretation to every objection to
the role of difficulty in defining achievement-value from above.
Recall the first objection:
Needless difficulty: According to DV/DCV, injecting capsaicin under one’s skin before writing
an academic essay will increase the value the achievement of writing that essay bears for the
writer ceteris paribus.
Does the effortful interpretation of DCV allow, problematically, for need-
lessly introduced difficulties to contribute to the value of achievements? In
short, sometimes.
Bradford (2015, pp. 93–94) responds to this objection by observing that
the ceteris paribus clause in the objection will not typically hold for a couple
reasons. First, DCV (like DV) is an account of achievement-value, not an
exhaustive account of welfare value much less of value generally. There will
of course often be many other evaluative considerations to make when de-
ciding how to write besides how to maximize effort. Second, making one’s
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achievements needlessly difficult will tend to prevent one from competently
carrying them out. So, assuming that competence is a necessary condition on
achievement-value, introducing needless difficulty will not actually enhance
achievement-value in those cases.
What about when the ceteris paribus clause does hold? In fact, many in-
stances of needless difficulty will contribute achievement-value according
to the effortful interpretation. We can, for instance, imagine a writer writing
just as competently with capsaicin under his skin as without. In that case, the
capsaicin would contribute achievement-value for the writer on the effortful
interpretation of DCV. This is counterintuitive since his task of writing does
not seem any more of an achievement in virtue of the additional, arbitrarily
introduced effort.
Bradford’s effortful interpretation of DCV implies that some, but not all
cases of needless difficulty, contribute achievement-value. It limits the scope
of the original objection, rather than addressing it completely.23
How does the competitive interpretation compare? It rules out the contri-
bution of needless difficulties to achievement-value much more fully and re-
gardless of whether competence is invoked as a separate condition. The
extra effort required of the pained writer, for instance, will not contribute
one iota to the difficulty of his task on the competitive interpretation, pro-
vided that the average competitor does not similarly inject capsaicin under
their skin. What matters on this interpretation is not how hard a task is felt
to be for the agent but how effortful it would be for a competitor. So, an
agent’s introducing arbitrary sources of effort to her task does not make that
task any more difficult or its completion any more valuable. This is a clear
advantage over the effortful interpretation.
The competitive interpretation does imply, however, that if a large pro-
portion of comparable authors made their task needlessly difficult by
exerting irrelevant effort, this irrelevant effort would bear on questions
of achievement-value. Such common though needless difficulty would
raise the bar of difficulty required for a valuable achievement in that ac-
tivity. While surprising, I think this is the correct conclusion. Many of
what we intuitively think of as remarkable achievements derive their dif-
ficulty not from an essential relation between the final goal and the ob-
stacles to reaching it but rather from the constraints conventionally
placed on the pursuit of the goal. Achieving in games is a clear example
of this. It is the arbitrary rules of baseball that make hitting a double a
valuable achievement. Rules that made this needlessly harder, or that re-
moved some of the needless difficulty, would have a direct effect on the
value of that achievement.
Chalk one up to the competitive interpretation. This is, admittedly, an in-
decisive reason to favor it over the effortful interpretation. The next two ad-
vantages are weightier.
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6. The competitive interpretation better handles misguided,
lucky effort
Recall once more:
Misguided but lucky effort: According to DV, stumbling upon a buried treasure by pure luck af-
ter following a dowsing rod through a desert counts as a highly valuable achievement for the
treasure-hunter because of the effort spent with the dowsing rod.
The lucky discoverer exerted a great deal of (misguided) effort. So this objec-
tion sticks to the effortful interpretation of DV. As we have already seen,
however, Bradford responds to this objection by invoking competence as a
further condition on achievement-value (per DCV). The lucky discoverer’s
lucky discovery does not count as a valuable achievement because it was
pursued in an incompetent manner.
This response, however, seems to me to confuse two different issues: One
issue is whether highly difficult and highly valuable achievements (call them
great achievements) can be lucky. It is another issue entirely whether mis-
guided effort contributes to the greatness of the achievement. In what fol-
lows, I argue that great achievements can be lucky but that misguided
effort does not contribute to their greatness. The competence requirement
is not necessary, on the competitive interpretation, to prevent misguided ef-
fort from contributing to the greatness of achievements. Moreover, the com-
petence requirement rules out too many cases of genuinely great though
lucky achievements. For this reason, I prefer DV to DCV.
Take the issue of misguided effort first. The lucky treasure-hunter is sup-
posed to have done something difficult that is only fortuitously connected
to his discovery. This seems like an objection to DV because it seems clear
that this difficulty does not constitute a valuable achievement, whereas ac-
cording to DV, achievement-value simply consists in difficulty.
This is not a problem for DV on the competitive interpretation, however,
since achievement-value never consists in the effort actually exerted by the
agent, misguided or not. What matters, on the competitive interpretation,
is how effortful the discovery would have been for the average treasure-
hunter (compared to the effort of the average treasure-hunt). The average
treasure-hunter would not have proceeded by using a dowsing rod, so the ef-
fort exerted doing this is not a factor on the difficulty of the discovery.
Whether the discovery was an achievement, then, has nothing to do with
the agent’s misguided effort on the competitive interpretation of DV. This
response is not available to the effortful interpretation, since what matters
on that view is simply how effortful the task happens to be for the agent.
Now for the separate issue of whether luck is consistent with achievement-
value. Consider, first, how DV evaluates the achievement-value of the lucky
treasure-hunter on the competitive interpretation. Reaching a verdict here
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requires comparing two average levels of effort: First, we need to determine
how much effort the average treasure-hunter exerts in discovering the aver-
age treasure. Let us call that level of effort AEA. Next, we need to know not
how much effort our lucky discoverer actually exerted (LEL) but how much
effort the average treasure-hunter would exert in discovering this lucky dis-
coverer’s lucky discovery (AEL). According to the competitive interpretation
of DV, the value of this lucky discoverer’s achievement is determined by the
extent to which AEL > AEA. If our lucky treasure-hunter stumbled upon a
hard-to-find treasure, then his discovery was indeed difficult and so a valu-
able achievement for him. If his treasure was easy-to-find, then it wasn’t a
valuable achievement.
This is a different conclusion regarding the achievement-value of the trea-
sure-hunter than we would get if we embraced DCV. But this seems to me
precisely the right conclusion for an account of achievement-value to reach.
For that reason, this seems to me an objection to the competence
requirement.24
Why is this the right conclusion? I offer three reasons.
On the competitive interpretation of DV, the lucky discovery of treasure
may in fact be a great achievement for the discoverer even though it involved
misguided effort. But to repeat, the achievement was not great because of its
misguided effort on this view. That would be true if, as on the effortful inter-
pretation, we took the misguided effort exerted to be relevant to the diffi-
culty of the task. But on the competitive interpretation, such effort is
irrelevant. It just so happens that the achievement was a competitive and,
so, a difficult one despite the manner in which it was pursued. It is the fact
of its competitiveness rather than the fact of the effort actually exerted that
makes it a great achievement. My first reason to embrace lucky achieve-
ments is that doing so does not require us to value misguided effort. This
wasn’t obvious when first considering the lucky treasure-hunter.
Now consider a less bizarre example:
Lucky swing: Jack is a baseball player with a .250 batting average, which is fairly typical and not
excellent. He takes to the plate at the bottom of the ninth in front a pitcher about to complete a
no-hitter. The pitcher throws his infamous curveball. Jack reacts with the same instincts he has
built up over years of playing, instincts that explain his batting average. He (mistakenly) swings
lower than he (incorrectly) thinks the ball is heading, but luckily, his mistaken executionmatches
his inaccurate prediction perfectly; he makes contact at just the right point in his swing sending
the ball out of the park and winning the game.
Here, unlike with the treasure-hunter, it’s intuitive that Jack’s home run is a
highly valuable achievement. That he was lucky does not seem to detract
from the difficulty or achievement-value of the task. My second reason to
embrace lucky achievements is that, when we consider cases that do not
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include grossly misguided effort, it is actually intuitive that luck is consistent
with achievement-value.
A third and deeper reason to embrace lucky achievements is that luck is a
nearly ubiquitous feature of the intuitively greatest achievements, even ones
that are competently executed. Consider this case:
Competently beating the odds: Jesuina is a competent treasure-hunter searching (competently)
for a submerged treasure somewhere in a vast region of the Pacific Ocean. This region is larger
than any person—or, indeed, any moderate-sized team of persons—can scour in a lifetime.
Using the best techniques and research, Jesuina forms a hunting plan, pursues it, and then dis-
covers the treasure.
Jesuina’s discovery was partially the product of good research and tech-
nique. Nevertheless, Jesuina’s research and technique were not enough to
guarantee success. As described, failure seemed much more likely than suc-
cess. So, if beating the odds in a manner that cannot be attributed to one’s
agency alone counts as doing something with the aid of luck, then Jesuina
was quite lucky indeed. But surely her lucky achievement is a paradigmati-
cally great one.25 And the very fact that she beats the odds is what here
signifies the greatness of her achievement. Thus, far from signifying non-
achievement, luck—once stripped of its connection to misguided effort—ac-
tually signifies great achievements.
One might try to weaken the connection between great achievements and
luck by arguing that, while Jesuina achieved something great, it was no
greater than a similar achievement pursued by the same means but where
the discovery required and obtained less luck.26 On such a view, luck would
be consistent with achievement-value, but we would discount achievement-
value in proportion to the luck involved. The problem with this response is
that many of the features of Jesuina’s task that mark out her achievement
as intuitively great just are those features that made her success depend upon
luck. These features are those properties of reality that determine the proba-
bility of success in a task pursued in a particular (competent) manner. For
Jesuina, they are the features determining how large an area she can search
and how narrowly she can determine the treasure’s whereabouts. Thus, the
proposed view would imply that discovering a buried treasure in the midst
of huge region of the Pacific bears no more achievement-value than discov-
ering a buried treasure in the midst of a much smaller region by the same
means. This amounts to throwing out our impression of the greatness of
achievements for the sake of blocking luck from correlating to their value
for the agents. But once we have distinguished the issue of misguided effort
from the issue of luck, I see no reason to block luck at such a cost.27
Recall that the goal of analyzing achievement-value is to account for the
contribution great achievements make to one’s welfare. We can ask other
evaluative questions about achievements, such as whether they exhibit
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expertise.28 That the success of the endeavor was lucky might count against
its being an exhibition of expertise. Perhaps exhibiting, acquiring, or
possessing expertise also contributes to one’s welfare. But I see no reason
to insist on the same constraints when analyzing achievement-value. That
luck can affect welfare value in the way entailed by embracing lucky achieve-
ments is similar to the familiar ways in which it can affect moral worth. As
withmoral theory, trying to insulate value theory from all impacts of luck so
evident in our daily lives threatens to disconnect our theory from lived
experience.
If my argument for embracing lucky achievements is successful, we have
reason to prefer DV to DCV since taking competence as a necessary condi-
tion on achievement-value rules out many cases of lucky achievements from
being genuinely valuable ones. This, in turn, gives us reason to adopt the
competitive interpretation of DV over the effortful interpretation, since the
effortful interpretation without the competence requirement implies that
misguided achievements aremore valuable for the agent because of their mis-
guided effort. We have, then, a second argument in favor of the competitive
interpretation of DV. I have saved the strongest argument for last.
7. The effortful interpretation cannot handle noneffortful
achievements
The most pressing objection to the effortful interpretation of DCV stems
from the following:
Effortless virtuosity: According to DV/DCV, a highly skilled and practiced performer of a tech-
nical composition on the violin does not attain an achievement of any significant value for her-
self in performing the piece insofar as doing so is relatively easy for her to do.
The effortful interpretation of the difficulty requirement implies that effort-
less (i.e. non-intensely effortful) performances of otherwise difficult tasks do
not count as valuable achievements for the performer. The competitive in-
terpretation does not. This is a significant advantage of the competitive in-
terpretation since playing a difficult violin piece flawlessly seems like a
genuine and valuable achievement for the virtuosic violinist.29
In this section, I consider, first, how the competitive interpretation handles
this case and, then, Bradford’s response to this objection. I argue that her ef-
fortful interpretation is unable to account for the full range of paradigmatic
achievements that aren’t effortful for the agent. I conclude that this
provides us with the strongest argument in favor of the competitive interpre-
tation of DV.
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7.1. COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF VIRTUOSITY
The competitive interpretation better handles the objection of effortless vir-
tuosity than the effortful interpretation. Because the difficulty of the task, on
the competitive interpretation, is measured by how much effort the average
competitor would exert in order to accomplish the same end, the effortless-
ness of the agent’s actual performance in no way diminishes the difficulty of
the task or the value of the achievement for the virtuoso.
In order to determine whether a virtuosic performance is a valuable
achievement on the competitive interpretation of DV, however, we need to
specify the relevant reference class (C3). Who are the relevant competitors
to our virtuosic violinist: other (professional) violinists or other virtuosi? I
am inclined to think there are multiple (potential) achievements here, but I
needn’t insist on this point. The competitive interpretation issues the follow-
ing conditional verdicts: If the reference class is taken to be any
(professional) violinist, then our virtuoso’s performance is a valuable
achievement for her; if virtuosi, then it depends on further facts about the ef-
fort this particular performance would require of other virtuosi compared to
the average effort of a virtuosic performance. If our virtuoso performed a
piece so challenging that most virtuosi would exert more effort performing
it than they would in the average virtuosic performance, then the competi-
tive interpretation yields the verdict that this performance bears achieve-
ment-value for the virtuoso. If this was a run-of-the-mill virtuosic
performance, then it might not bear achievement-value for the virtuoso.
These conditional conclusions seem to me entirely appropriate and cer-
tainly far preferable to the conclusion that virtuosic performances never bear
any achievement-value for the virtuoso. That latter conclusion is what fol-
lows from the effortful interpretation since the difficulty requirement on that
interpretation demands that a task involvemuch intense effort on the agent’s
part in order for it to bear any achievement-value. Bradford embraces this
conclusion, though she introduces a distinct sense in which the virtuoso does
achieve something (something, however, of no achievement-value for her).
Difficulty is an agent-relative notion on the effortful interpretation (E3).
Bradford points out that we can coin a derivative notion of difficulty by
making recourse to an ad hoc reference class (such as the class of average per-
sons in relevantly similar circumstances). Such a derivative notion allows us
to say that some activities are difficult relative to a reference class without
being difficult for the agent. But, to be clear, such derivative difficulty does
not contribute achievement-value on Bradford’s effortful interpretation.
On her view, a virtuosic performance can be difficult and so an achievement
(vis-à-vis some reference class) even though it is neither difficult nor a valu-
able achievement for the virtuoso (2015, p. 62).
It seems wrong to me, and others,30 to say that the effortlessness of the
performance prevents it from being a valuable achievement for the
© 2019 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2019 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
THE COMPETITION ACCOUNT OF ACHIEVEMENT-VALUE 1033
virtuoso. I grant, however, that musical performances require a great
deal of practice doing approximately the same activity as the perfor-
mance. So perhaps a polished (because patiently practiced) performance
is not the remarkable achievement the virtuoso reaches; perhaps the real
achievement here is acquiring virtuosity. While this observation helps
with the case of the virtuoso, there is a much larger class of noneffortful
artistry, which Bradford does not consider, and which increases the strain
on the effortful interpretation.
7.2. MORE DIFFICULT CASES THAN VIRTUOSITY
First, consider
Patient creation: Helga31 is an established, successful painter. She follows a humble, daily rou-
tine, which she often finds enjoyable. Her most recent project proceeds more easily than usual.
Its completion involved far below the average level of intense effort she has come to expect from
such a project and even farther below the intense effort required of a comparable work of art by
the average artist. When she finishes, she believes it to be her best artistic creation to date, one so
highly innovative that it will mark a new movement in the medium. Others agree. Years later,
her belief is confirmed.
Helga clearly has achieved something valuable. Such a patient creation is a
real achievement, it seems to me, and is genuinely valuable if any achieve-
ments are. But Helga’s case fails to meet the difficulty requirement on
Bradford’s effortful interpretation of DCV. Because the amount of intense
effort involved in the creation was minimal, far less than average, Helga’s
creation fails to clear the threshold of difficulty necessary for being a valu-
able achievement (E4). A different result follows from the competitive inter-
pretation. Helga’s artistic contribution certainly would have been effortful
for the average painter. So the competitive interpretation implies that
Helga’s creation is a valuable achievement for her.
Consider, second,
Creation in the zone: Sofía is a novelist who has recently relocated to rural New England where
the present winter is especially harsh. With scenic but uninviting views of the world from her
desk, she finds it easy to plug away on her latest book. In her daily writing, she quickly enters
into the zone, effortlessly putting words on the page, designing, and then carrying out her vision.
She completes her first draft in two short months which seem to breeze by. This draft becomes
her most critically acclaimed novel.
The average drafting of a novel is not, I suppose, spent almost entirely in
the zone the way Sofía’s was. If we also assume that writing while in the
zone is not intensely effortful, then Sofía’s achievement involves less in-
tense effort than the average comparable novel. So Sofía’s composition
of her novel fails to count as difficult or, for that reason, as a valuable
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achievement on the effortful interpretation. Again, her achievement is a
valuable one on the competitive interpretation since the average writer
would presumably have to work harder than on the average novel in or-
der to write such an acclaimed book. Here, too, the competitive interpre-
tation seems to reach the right conclusion, whereas the effortful
interpretation does not: Sofía’s composition was a valuable achievement
for her.
Finally, consider a third case32:
Spontaneous creation: Irmin33 was aWest-German composer who, in the 1960s, traveled toNew
York City and spent time at the Chelsea Hotel. He experimented there with improvisational
rock music on the piano opposite a bass player. He described the experience this way, ‘I would
play a simple melody, and then he would play a few notes on the bass that completely changed
the harmonic context. Then I would offer a new variation within that context, and he would re-
interpret again.’This improvisational session led Irmin to a whole new approach to popularmu-
sic within the rock milieu. He returned to West Germany and formed an experimental rock
band, which became one of the most influential bands in Europe in the middle of the century.
When asked, he did not exactly describe hismusical co-creations as easy, but he repeatedly called
them effortless, much less strenuous than his traditional compositions.
Irmin’s spontaneous creations are genuine achievements, but they fail to
involve as much intense effort for Irmin as his traditional compositions
did. Indeed, it is unclear whether Irmin’s effort was intense at all. For reasons
analogous to those above, Irmin seems not to have done anything difficult
on the effortful interpretation even though he has on the competitive inter-
pretation. So, again, this case points in favor of the latter.
Our sense that Helga, Sofía, and Irmin each attained a genuinely valuable
achievement undermines the intuitive connection between exerted effort and
great achievement that Bradford’s view builds on. A lot of artistic creations
fail to count as genuinely valuable achievements for the artists on the effort-
ful interpretation. It’s possible that Bradford, in dismissing the counterex-
ample of virtuosic performance, did not appreciate how expansive the
range of noneffortful creations is. This expanse alone increases the pressure
on us to adopt the competitive interpretation rather than the effortful inter-
pretation. Moreover, I show that the proposed response to the case of the
virtuoso considered above is of no use in these other cases.
7.3. WHY THESE CASES ARE MORE DECISIVE
The cases of noneffortful creations I described above share an important fea-
ture that may not necessarily belong to effortless virtuosity but which is in-
tuitively connected to achievement-value. These cases are stipulated to
result in what we might call artistic contributions—the creation of genuinely
original and influential works of art. What counts as an achievement in art
more than such contribution? Indeed, Huddleston (2012) plausibly suggests
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that artistic value (as opposed to the aesthetic or other value of an artwork)
consists precisely in the achievement-value of the creation of art.34
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the value of the achievement consists
in the value of the artwork that results. I endorse DV according to which the
value of the achievement consists in its difficulty. What I am suggesting,
however, is that artistic contribution is a paradigm case of a valuable
achievement. So we have a reasonable (though defeasible) expectation that
an account of achievement-value would count such contributions as
valuable.
This expectation is why the effortful interpretation of DCV disappoints so
much when it fails to classify such contributions as valuable achievements.
Given the competitive interpretation as an alternative that meets this expec-
tation, we can ask whether it is more desirable to preserve the intuition that
intense effort is necessary for an achievement than that artistic contributions
are valuable achievements. And since I have already raised separate reasons
to refine the intuition that effort contributes achievement-value, this intui-
tion seems to provide even less reason to defy our expectation of the achieve-
ment-value of artistic contributions.
It does not help the effortful interpretation, moreover, to propose that the
real achievement reached by Helga, Sofía, and Irmin is that of becoming an
artist who creates artistic contributions with little effort. Helga certainly
achieves something valuable by becoming a methodical and patient creator;
so, too, do Sofía and Irmin. But there are at least three reasons to reject the
proposal that this is the only source of achievement-value for the
noneffortful creator.
First, if Huddleston (2012) is right that artistic value just is achieve-
ment-value, then reducing the apparent achievement-value of Helga’s cre-
ation to the achievement of becoming the artist she is would imply that
her beautiful, innovative, and influential creations also bear no artistic
value!
Second, the proposal implies that, by becoming especially competent in
creating art effortlessly, one thereby achieves less of value for oneself in so
creating. But it seems odd to say that becoming good at achieving something
can render future achievement less valuable for one. It’s no doubt true that
when a child gets the hang of riding her bike, riding around the block ceases
to be a valuable achievement for her. But if a professional cyclist were to be-
come so good at cycling that she completed the Tour of Flanders as easily as
the child rides around the block, would it thereby cease to be a valuable
achievement for the professional? Many of the world’s greatest achievers
are also among the most competent in what they achieve. This is why I am
able to generate several examples of noneffortful artistic creation where both
the effortlessness and the greatness of the achievements are intuitive. But if
we reduce this achievement-value to that of acquiring competence, then
the value of the achievements of these great achievers would, according to
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the effortful interpretation, tend to be far less for them than the value for an
ambitious dabbler of a one-off success. This is because the expert exerts far
less effort in creating original artwork, winning competitions, etc. than the
ambitious dabbler whose tremendous effort just happens to be successful
this once.
On DCV, of course, the more competent the achievement, the more
valuable it is all else being equal and provided it meets the necessary con-
dition of difficulty. So the effortful interpretation of DCV does not imply
that competence detracts from achievement-value in all cases. But it does
imply that (1) competence sufficient for reducing the level of intense ef-
fort an agent exhibits in the achievement does render the achievement less
valuable and that (2) in cases like the ones I described where that reduc-
tion leads to below-average intense effort, competence undermines any
achievement-value in the task whatsoever. Competence, in short, some-
times contributes to achievement-value, sometimes diminishes it, and
sometimes negates it entirely. This is a highly revisionist account of
achievement-value. In this way, as in others, the competitive interpreta-
tion conserves more of what I think are our ordinary judgments about
achievement-value.
The third reason to reject the proposal that the achievement-value of
noneffortful creations be reduced to the achievement-value of becoming
an artist who creates effortlessly is that the proposal fails to account for all
our relevant intuitions about noneffortful creations. Consider the following
comparison: Imagine Liam who, just like Helga, has become a patient crea-
tor, and imagine that for several years they lead identical artistic careers.
This last year, however, Helga created a genuine artistic contribution while
Liam did not despite his working on a project just as methodically as Helga.
Does Helga not acquire more achievement-value in total than Liam? But if
the only source of Helga’s achievement-value is becoming a patient creator,
then Liam would seem to have acquired just as much, according to the ef-
fortful interpretation.
It might be mistakenly thought that Helga acquired more achievement-
value than Liam in becoming who she is because becoming who she is
was a greater achievement in virtue of the fact that Helga achieves more
in the end. But it does not follow, on the effortful interpretation, that be-
cause Helga goes on to achieve more becoming Helga was a greater
achievement. It may have been that prior to becoming a patient artist,
Liam had many bad artistic habits (such as waiting for inspiration to
strike and drinking or using drugs to hasten it). Overcoming these habits
may well have involved much more intense effort (thus, difficulty) than
Helga’s self-creation. In that case, Liam’s achievement of becoming
who he is was actually a more valuable achievement than Helga’s on
the effortful interpretation, quite in contrast to the difference in their cre-
ative output.
© 2019 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2019 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
THE COMPETITION ACCOUNT OF ACHIEVEMENT-VALUE 1037
My point is that we cannot explain away our intuitions about noneffortful
creations by appeal to the distinction between achievement-value for an
agent of creating something and achievement-value for the agent of having
become the person who creates something. The value of the latter achieve-
ment does not track, on Bradford’s account, the value of one’s creative en-
deavors. Nor, I suppose, should it.
We have, then, one more—and I think the strongest—reason to endorse
the competitive interpretation over and against the effortful interpretation.
The former, unlike the latter, can account for the achievement-value
noneffortful artistic contributions bear for the artist. The competitive inter-
pretation, we have seen, also provides a better explanation for why needless
or misguided effort does not contribute to the value of an achievement, and
it offers a more compelling account of how valuable achievements can
be lucky.
My arguments depend on a variety of evaluative intuitions, which are
not always the surest guides in analysis. I certainly do not mean to insist
that we heed all of our intuitions no matter what. But as with the entire
literature on achievement-value, I have striven to show that there is a
kind of reflective equilibrium available to the competitive interpretation
that is unavailable to the effortful interpretation given that, on the latter
interpretation, needless difficulties can often still contribute to achieve-
ment-value, while a lucky or noneffortful task can never be a valuable
achievement for the agent.
8. The objection of personal struggle
Before closing, I consider an objection to my competitive interpretation of
DV that might be thought to upset the reflective equilibrium I have endeav-
ored to establish.35
Consider this case:
Personal struggle: Django36 was a guitarist who, through injury, lost the ability to play on the
fretboard with his third and fourth fingers. And yet he went on to become one of the most vir-
tuosic and accomplished jazz guitar players of all time. His innovations in composition and per-
formance have had a lasting effect on jazz music and guitar-playing generally.
The competitive interpretation of DV rightly concludes that Django’s artis-
tic contributions are great achievements. It implies, too, that Django’s ac-
quisition of virtuosity on the guitar is a great achievement. So far, so
good. But the competitive interpretation also seems to imply that Django’s
accomplishments bear no more achievement-value for him than identical
contributions on the guitar would for a guitarist able to use four fretboard
fingers. Surely, one might object, Django’s innovative performances were
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more difficult because of his injured hand. But since, on the competitive
model, what matters is how effortful the performances would be for an av-
erage competitor rather than how much effort the agent herself exhibits in
the performance, the number of digits Django deployed would seem to be
irrelevant to the value of his achievements.
Django is relevantly similar to a large number of cases where personal
struggles seem to bear on the difficulty and value of achievements. One
might conclude that the competitive interpretation is misaligned with an im-
portant set of our intuitions and that, perhaps, it needs to be supplemented
by an agent-relative notion of difficulty in the manner of von Kriegstein’s
dualistic interpretation.
These conclusions would be too hasty. Whether Django represents a com-
pelling counterexample to the competitive interpretation depends on which
of Django’s achievements we take his injury to be relevant to assessing.
Let us distinguish two broad achievements: his artistic contributions and
his acquisition of virtuosity on the fretboard. They were certainly both great,
but was one or the other greater in virtue of Django’s physiological limita-
tions? I argue that, while his injury plausibly did impact the value of his ac-
quisition of virtuosity, it did not impact the achievement-value of his musical
contributions—that is, his performances and compositions (which were
intertwined).
To begin with the latter point, I encourage those unfamiliar with the real
Django Reinhardt to consult videos of his playing. He was a master on the
guitar. His first and second fingers on his left hand moved so fluidly along
the fretboard as to defy any perception of effort or strain. He played fast, al-
ways smoking, and never stumbling. Having become virtuosic, his perfor-
mances, at least, were decidedly not specially effortful in his case. While I
agree that we want to sayDjango did something especially difficult in his life
in virtue of his injury, and that our interpretation of DV should allow for
that special difficulty to contribute to the value of his achievements, I argue
that it’s a mistake to attribute this special difficulty to his performances and
compositions. His artistic contributions were greater achievements not be-
cause they involved more effort for him than for other influential guitarists
(they did not anyway) but because and to the extent that they were more
competitive.
Django’s acquisition of virtuosity, however, probably was more difficult
due to his injury. (He was already a skilled guitarist before the injury, and
so he had to adapt to a new style of playing). We do seem to have reason
to regard this acquisition as a greater achievement in his case. I do not regard
this as a problem for the competitive interpretation ofDV, however, because
I think Django’s achievement of acquiring virtuosity is not directly compa-
rable to the acquisition of virtuosity with four fretboard fingers. Django’s
virtuosity-acquisition required different processes, had different and fewer
if any models to follow, and crucially resulted in different performative
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techniques than his acquisition of virtuosity before the injury. All these dif-
ferences are surely relevant to determining the class of activity in terms of
which we specify the reference class of competitors when assessing the diffi-
culty and so value of Django’s achievement of virtuosity on my competitive
interpretation.
In summary, the competitive interpretation of DV entails that
1a. Django’s musical contributions were highly difficult and valuable
achievements.
1b. The difficulty and achievement-value of his contributions are directly
comparable to those of guitarists able to play with four fretboard
fingers.
2a. Django’s (re)acquisition of virtuosity was a highly difficult and valu-
able achievement.
2b. The difficulty and achievement-value of his acquisition of virtuosity
are not directly comparable to those of guitarists who play with four
fretboard fingers.
I believe that all four of these implications are correct, and it would be an ob-
jection to an account of achievement-value if it did not cohere with all four.
It is a mark against the effortful interpretation, for instance, that it contra-
dicts 1a. Less obvious, perhaps, is that to deny 1b would be condescending
to Django as it would be for analogous cases; it would be tantamount to
distinguishing Django’s artistic contributions from other contributions on
the sole basis of Django’s physiological limitations. The music he left behind
is beautiful, innovative, and has been influential. What makes this music an
achievement for him is not the difficulty for someone like him ofmaking such
music but its difficulty full stop. This gives us reason to conclude, not only
that the competitive interpretation stands in need of no supplementation
by an agent-relative account of difficulty, but that in fact the agent-relative
account leads us astray here. When we transition from considering Django’s
contributions to considering his virtuosity, we see that to deny 2b would be
to identify mistakenly the activity of acquiring skills and habits constitutive
of musical virtuosity with the performance they make possible. Django’s
musical compositions/performances are one thing, the constitutive elements
of his virtuosity are another.
While these implications are specific to Django, they represent how to ap-
ply the competitive model to other cases where personal struggle seems to
bear on the value of an achievement. In the final analysis, the answer on
the competitive interpretation depends, as it should, onwhether the struggles
in question are relevant to marking off a distinct activity and so reference
class for the achievement in question. Often, as in Django’s case, there are
discrete but overlapping achievements which require careful analysis and
imply discrete reference classes. A systematic account of these cases would
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require a fuller account of how to determine activity classes, which will have
to wait for a subsequent paper.
9. Conclusion
To capture the competitive interpretation of DV with a slogan, the value of
an achievement is measured not by how hard the agent worked for it but by
how hard others would need to do in order to measure up. We aremore, not
less, impressed by the deftness of a practiced competitor who easily dispenses
with her opponent. To treat such a performance as less of an achievement
for the victor is to lose sight of some of the most paradigmatic instances of
valuable achievements—including artistic creation. I have proposed an in-
terpretation ofDV that allows us to preserve this impression, by defining dif-
ficulty not in terms of effort actually expended (by the agent) but in terms of
effort required (by a competitor).
This paper offers several reasons to favor the competitive interpretation
over the effortful interpretation of DV. First, the competitive interpretation
captures our sense that original and influential artistic creations can be gen-
uinely valuable achievements for the artists even when their creation in-
volves little or no intense effort. Noneffortful creations are common forms
of achievement. So it is a strength of the competitive interpretation that it
preserves our sense of their achievement-value.
Second, the competitive interpretation is more flexible regarding how ef-
fort is measured than the effortful interpretation. Third, on the competitive
interpretation, an agent’s arbitrary or misguided effort will not contribute to
the value of the achievement. This is because the effort actually exerted by
the agent is not, on this view, what determines the difficulty and so value
of the achievement. While the effortful interpretation can partially rule out
such cases, the competitive interpretation does so much more fully.
Fourth, the competitive interpretation allows us to preserve the thought
that difficulty itself constitutes—rather than merely contributing to—the
value of an achievement. It allows us, that is, to dispense with the compe-
tence requirement of DCV. Besides being more parsimonious, maintaining
DV on its own allows a lucky achievement to be a valuable achievement
for the agent provided the achievement itself would be difficult for the aver-
age competitor. As I argued above, there is a partial correlation between the
greatness of an achievement and the luck involved in bringing it about, so
embracing lucky achievements is a desirable feature of an account of
achievement-value.
I close with one final argument in favor of the competitive interpretation
of DV. Recall the thought experiment of a utopia where everything we want
and need (including relief from boredom) is available through no effort on
our part. Bradford rightly observes that we would, in such a utopia, seek
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ways to introduce difficulty into our lives. It seems to me, however, that
rather than looking for ways of expending effort for its own sake, we would
instead seek ways to compete with ourselves and others. We would set ends
the success of which is uncertain, and if we succeed, we would modify these
ends to be more ambitious. We are more disappointed, I suggest, by failing
to measure up to our literal, implicit, or self-competition than we are when
our endeavors involve less phenomenal effort than we expect.
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NOTES
1 I would like to thank Colleen Cressman, Paul Katsafanas, and two anonymous reviewers
for their comments on various drafts. They lent me assistance through their insights, clarifiedmy
thinking through their questions, and encouraged my work through their interest. I would also
like to thank Bernard Reginster, current and former colleagues at Boston University, and my
students at Boston University, Emerson College, and Lesley University for fruitful conversa-
tions on issues discussed in this paper.
2 Hurka (1996), Keller (2004), Portmore (2007), Bradford (2013, 2015), von Kriegstein
(2017, 2019), and Hirji (2019). Bradford (2013, p. 204) even opens her essay with the claim,
‘Achievements are, if any thing is, on the “objective list” of the things that canmake a life a good
one.’
3 While I do not explore the issue here, it should be noted that there is no reason to limit the
domain of possible achievements to those intentional, goal-directed activities that succeed in
attaining the specific goal one set out to accomplish. We often do not have a fully accurate pic-
ture of the goal we are pursuing until we have achieved it.
4 Portmore (2007), Bradford (2015), and Hirji (2019). Cf. von Kriegstein (2019).
5 Keller (2004, pp. 32–34), Portmore (2007, pp. 11–12), and von Kriegstein (2017, pp. 47–
51).
6 I borrow these last two examples from Bradford (2015, pp. 100–103, 31) who intends to
defend her view against them.
7 Von Kriegstein (2019) and Hirji (2019) have both quite recently proposed new accounts
aiming to address some of the criticisms raised to Bradford’s. While these accounts are interest-
ing, they are (1) quite a bit less developed than Bradford’s as well as (2) more recent and perhaps
less well known. More importantly, they (3) do not defend DV as I propose to do and (4) depart
where I followBradfordwhile followingwhere I depart. For these reasons, I find it useful to con-
trast my view primarily to Bradford’s. I note several advantages I takemy proposal to have over
these others throughout what follows.
8 It seems to be this assumption that leads Portmore (2007) to replaceDVwith what he calls
‘the Investment Condition (IC)’ in analyzing achievement-value. According to IC, achievements
are more valuable the more we have invested in them. Difficulty would be a sign of investment.
Bradley (2011) shows that Portmore’s specific explanation of achievement-value rests on an un-
tenable evaluative principle. I argue, moreover, that Portmore’s approach of substituting IC for
DV is itself misguided: The difficulty we confront in carrying out a task is not a welfare-cost
invested in an achievement and in need of redemption.
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9 Translations of Nietzsche are mine based on Nietzsche (2009).
10 This addition is necessary to shut down Schopenhauer’s (2015 [1851], p. 263) own re-
sponse to a similar thought experiment, namely, that boredom is an evenmore painful state than
striving.
11 Bradford proposes the following as a general analysis of the concept of difficulty and not
only of the difficulty condition on achievement-value.My criticism and alternative, however, are
limited to the question of how to interpret DV, so I do not pursue the question of whether either
interpretation suffices as an analysis of the general concept. It is my considered view (contra
Bradford, von Kriegstein, 2019, and others) that difficulty is polysemic and does not afford a
fully general analysis.
12 Bradford does not explicitly state that effort is to be understood first-personally, but this
seems to be what she has in mind: She considers it conceptually primitive; she uses thought ex-
periments that draw on introspection; she compares effort to pleasure (2015, p.42); and through-
out the chapter (2015, Ch. 2), she proposes to measure effort through tools developed for
hedonic metrics. See von Kriegstein (2017) for a detailed discussion of her notion of effort.
13 In context, it’s clear that Nietzsche is also discussing a person’s ambition and not just her
capacity to achieve. But his point remains that both are to be measured by the ‘might’ of the
competitor sought and overcome.
14 Von Kriegstein (2019, p. 61) is explicit that this account of achievement-value is only a
‘sketch’ in need of further development.
15 Again, see von Kriegstein (2017) for a detailed discussion of Bradford’s notion of effort
and some critical arguments regarding how best to elaborate it. Some of his concerns with
Bradford’s notion of effort are rendered moot in the context of the competitive interpretation
(see Section 5). A full consideration of how to measure effort within the competitive interpreta-
tion will have to wait for another paper.
16 Consider a measure of effort suggested to me by an anonymous reviewer: effort as the en-
ergy expended in the performance of the task’s mechanical and computational components. One
immediate concern for this proposal is that some energy expended by a machine or organism
during such tasks is lost to mechanical inefficiencies and unrelated organic processes, and these
inefficiencies do not seem to contribute to the difficulty of the task proper. For example, the en-
ergy spent digesting breakfast does not seem relevant to measuring the difficulty of shovelling
snow.Wemight partially address this by focusing on energy output rather than energy input sim-
ilarly to how we measure the output of an automobile engine ([weight × distance]/time).—Re-
placing phenomenal effort with something like horsepower in Bradford’s effortful
interpretation leads to untenable results, whereas applying this model of effort to the competitive
model would not radically alter its verdicts. Imagine two competitive runners who finish the
same race in the same time: H is 160 pounds and L is 140 pounds. On the horsepower-effortful
interpretation, H did something more difficult than L. And so, H would attain more achieve-
ment-value than L all else being equal. On the horsepower-competitive interpretation, however,
what matters would not be the level of horsepower H generates but the horsepower required of
the average runner to match H’s performance compared to the horsepower required of the av-
erage runner for the average comparable race. This comparison is not affected by the relative
weights of H and L. So the values of the achievement for H and for L respectively have nothing
to do with their respective weights.
17 I appreciate two anonymous reviewers’ calls for a thorough discussion of this point.
18 There is no special conceptual hurdle to determining comparableness of works, even if
there are epistemic hurdles.Wemight, for instance, consider a work comparable if it bears a sim-
ilar number of difficult-making features to similar extents as do other works, where which fea-
tures are difficult-making is determined by polling professional philosophers. This approach
assumes a phenomenalmeasure of effort (as in E2) and that self-report tracks phenomenal effort.
We would employ a different approach if we thought a different model of effort was more sa-
lient. Again, my focus is a level above the analysis of effort.
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19 My preposterous example of Bolt is meant to avoid complications regarding how to
demarcate the relevant class of activity for self-competitions since I cannot explore the mat-
ter in sufficient detail here. On both the effortful and the competitive interpretations, the
threshold of difficulty marking off an instance of competing with oneself as a valuable
achievement will depend upon how the activity is construed and how one’s performance
compares to the average performance in that activity. For the effortful interpretation, what
matters is how your level of effort compares to the average competitor’s. For mine, it’s how
much effort your performance would require of your competitor. If the activity class of your
morning jog is one in which you can reach a valuable achievement, the effortful interpreta-
tion would imply that how hard the jog was for you—the extent to which you were out of
breath, etc.—compared to your average level of effort would determine the difficulty and
value of that achievement. On my competitive interpretation, however, it’s roughly how fast
you ran a particular course compared to how fast you have run it that would determine its
difficulty and so achievement-value. On this as on other issues, the competitive interpreta-
tion of difficulty seems to draw our attention to the more salient considerations; we take do-
ing a personal best to be a valuable achievement whereas having to exert ourselves extra
hard is a sign of non-achievement.
20 Both vonKriegstein (2019) andHirji (2019) also take up this further move.My objections
to it, below, thus serve as objections to their views.
21 Bradford (2015, p. 65) defends the following view: ‘The extent to which somebody causes
something competently is a matter of the extent to which they have justified and true beliefs
(JTBs) about what they are doing. Whether or not somebody is causing something at all compe-
tently is a matter of having some requisite measure of JTBs. So to cause something competently,
you need to have enough JTBs, and the more JTBs you have, the more competently you cause
it.’ I have reservations about describing competence in terms of countable JTBs. (For one alter-
native, see Sosa, 2010.) But since the competitive interpretation of DV does not require compe-
tence to be a necessary or contributory condition on achievement-value, I do not pursue the
matter here.
22 My objections focus on the claim that competence is a necessary condition on achieve-
ment-value. I leave consideration of whether competence should be retained as a contributory
condition for another time. My view does, though, handle all the objections raised in this paper
without any reliance on competence.
23 Bradford could respond by adopting von Kriegstein’s (2017, pp. 49–51) proposal to fur-
ther restrict what effort exerted by the agent is relevant to determining its difficulty. He proposes
a requirement that the agent not believe the effort fails to contribute to her success. This might
indeed further restrict the problem cases for the effortful interpretation (e.g. by ruling out the ef-
fort exerted during obsessive–compulsive rituals), but it would not obviate them entirely. The
writer we are imagining, for example, may have no occurrent beliefs about the contribution
his pain will make to his success in writing, or he may even falsely believe that the pain makes
his success more likely. It still seems wrong, in either case, to say that the pain contributes to
the value of his achievement.
24 For the same reason, this seems to be an objection to the accounts proposed by Hirji
(2019) and von Kriegstein (2019).
25 It should be noted that, with Jesuina’s case, I am not pumping our intuitions againstDCV.
Jesuina’s achievement is likely to be difficult on either interpretation and competent on
Bradford’s interpretation.My present point is that Jesuina’s case helps us to appreciate that luck
does not discount achievement-value.
26 The implications of this response would as best as I can tell converge on what Bradford’s
account would imply regarding such cases. If so, my objection to this response is an objection to
Bradford’s view.
27 Hirji (2019), too, argues that luck is at least compatible with achievement-value in many
cases. And von Kriegstein (2019) argues that the points I was just making get straight to one of
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the constitutive features of achievement-value: viz., the probability of success. (N.b. I have only
claimed, in contrast to vonKriegstein, that luck or beating the odds signifies achievement-value;
achievement-value remains on my view constituted by its difficulty interpreted in terms of its
competitiveness.) There seems, then, to be a shared sense that Bradford’s rejection of luck at least
goes too far. Hirji and von Kriegstein, however, still embrace a version of DCV.
28 See Lopes (2018, Ch. 5) for an account of aesthetic expertise that affords competence pride
of place.
29 Cf. von Kriegstein (2017, 2019) and Hirji (2019).
30 Again, see Hirji (2019) and von Kriegstein (2017, 2019).
31 Think here of what is sometimes called the emergence of the muse as it occurs in highly
methodical artists. Cf. the self-descriptions of Ernest Hemingway and Stephen King, and
Corinna Belz’s depiction of Gerhard Richter’s methodical routines in the film Gerhard Richter
Painting (2017).
32 I note a fourth, more controversial case: the delegated manner of artistic creation for
which Andy Warhol was famous and which, in a different way, one sees in the work of Ai
Weiwei. Whether these are a clear counterexample to the effortful interpretation depends on
how we classify their activities and on how much intense effort is involved in such art manage-
ments. It seems at least imaginable that some delegated creations are genuinely valuable achieve-
ments for the delegators and that they involve below-average intense effort on the delegators’
parts.
33 Irmin is based on the composer and musician Irmin Schmidt who cofounded the band,
Can, in Cologne in 1968. The quotation is a rough paraphrase of his interview in the 1999 doc-
umentary, Can—The Documentary.
34 To avoid confusion, there is another sense of artistic achievement in the aesthetics litera-
ture the value of which is distinct from the achievement-value I am here attributing to
noneffortful creation. The value I am after is the welfare value for the artist of having accom-
plished a great achievement in her artistic contribution. On the one hand, I believe that this is
the sense of achievement-value Huddleston (2012) proposes to equate with artistic value. On
the other hand, Lopes (2018) has a distinct sense of aesthetic achievement in viewwhen proposing
to account for the normativity of aesthetic value in terms of aesthetic achievement. Lopes’ sense
of achievement is roughly that of a successful performance of an action caused by the agent’s
competence. It is meant to capture the conditions and value of expert agency, and Lopes (p.
98) is explicit that it is not meant to capture the conditions of achievement-value in my sense.
35 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing for a fuller discussion of this objection.
36 Django is, of course, based on the famous case of Django Reinhardt (1910–1953).
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